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CASE COMMENTS
BIL~s AND NOTEs-BANKS AND BANKING--NOTATION CHECK
GxvEN "FoR TnREE SOUND Mr.ns" DoEs NOT GIVE NOTICE op
CONDITIONAL SALE-BANK WIRING AGREEMENT TO PAY CHECK IS

BOUND THERms.-The defendant bought three mules and gave
his check for them. Across the face of the cheek was written
"For three sound mules." The plaintiff cashed the check, but
before cashing it he wired the drawee: "Will you pay check
signed W. A. Roberts, $275.00?" The drawee wired: "Will
pay check signed W. A. Roberts, $275.00."
The defendant was displeased with the mules and notified
the drawee not to pay the check, and it refused to do so. The
plaintiff made the drawee party defendant. Held, (1) the words
"For three sound mules," did not give the plaintiff notice that
it was given in a conditional sale, since such notations are commonly used as memoranda for the drawer of the check, and the
plaintiff was a holder in due course in view of the Kentucky Stat
utes, section 3702b, subsection 56. (2)A bank which wired its
willingness to pay a check drawn upon it, before the bank making the inquiry had cashed it, is bound to pay the check.
There are two questions involved in the case, the first:
Whether a memorandum across the face of the note, showing the
consideration for which it was given, gives notice of a conditional
sale contract? The preponderance of authority holds that it does
not give notice of a conditional sale, and the negotiability of
the instrument is not thereby destroyed.
"The negotiable instruments law expressly provides that an
unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional, within the
meaning of the act, although coupled with a statement of the
transaction which gives rise to the instrument. Stete v. Hiltonm,
96 Pac. 926, and in so far as it provides as to when a promise is
unconditional it is merely declaratory of the common law.
Hutchinson First National Bank v. Ligh.tner, 74 Kan. 736; Snohomish First National Bank v. Sullivan, 66 Wash. 375. So independent of statute, the statement in a bill or note of the consideration on which it is founded, or of the transaction out of
which it arose, does not affect its negotiable character. Sherma&
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Bank v. A. Apperson, 4 Fed. 25; Pyron v. Ruohs, 120 Ga. 1060:
Beatty v. Western College, 177 I!l. 280; Hutchinson First Natianu Bank v. Lightner, 74 Kan. 736; Matthews v. Crosby, 56
N. H. 21; Chase v. Behrman, 10 Daly (N. Y.) 344, unless it qualifies the promise. For instance a note reciting that it is for rent:
Simmons v. Council, 5 Ga. 386, or in consideration of certain personal property, Goshen and Minisink Turnpike Road v. Hurtin,
9 John. (N. Y.) 217 (held note was negotiable in which defendant promised to pay to the plaintiff $120.00 for five shares of cap-.
ital stock of the said corporation), is not rendered negotiable
because of such statements." 8 C. J., section 213. The decisions
laid down by the Kentucky court are in keeping with the weight
of authority. Duncan v. Louisville, (13 Bush) 378; Warner v.
Broddus, 2 J. J. Mar. 264. Therefore the judgment as to the
first question is affirmed.
The second question: Whether a telegram promising to pay
a certain check constitutes an acceptance of the check. The general rule is that " a valid acceptance may be made by telegram.
Garrettsonv. North Atchison Bank, 7 L. R. A. 428, but the terms
of such writing must be so clear as not to admit of doubt." 7
Cyc. 765.
In the case of the FirstNational Bank of Atchison v.iCommercial Savings Bank, 87 Pac. 746, the payee telegraphed: "Is
J. F. Donald's check on you, $350.00, good?" The drawee answered: "J. F. Donald's check is good for that sum." The
above cited case differs from the present one in that there was not
such an answer as to clearly and unequivocally import an absolute promise to pay, while in the present case there was an expressed promise to pay.
Again, in the case of Colcord v. Banco De Tamaulipas, 169
N. Y. S. 710, it was held that a telegram that a draft "is good,"'
in answer to a telegram asking a bank if it would pay it, was not
an acceptance, nor an agreement to accept. There was only a
statement that the drawer was good for a certain sum; there was
no expressed promise to pay, nor can one be implied from such
an answer.
A reply telegram stating that the bank had money on deposit to pay a certain check, was held equivalent to an acceptance
in the case of Ellitt v. FirstState Bank of Ft.Stockton, 152 S. W.
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808. Garrettson v. North Atchison Bank, 47 Fed. 867, held that
where a payee telegraphed drawee asking if it would pay T.'s
check for $22,000.00, and the drawee answered, "T. is good, send
on your paper," that this was equivalent to an acceptance in
writing. In re Armstrong, 41 Fed. 381, held that a telegram
promising to pay a certain draft constitutes an acceptance of
the draft.
The case of Selna Bank v. Webster County Bank, 206 S. W.
870, where a payee telegraphed the drawee, asking if it would
pay T.'s check "up to $2,000.00," and the drawee answered by
telegram, "We will honor T.'s check for $2,000.00," the drawee
bound itself to cash a check up to that sum. The above cited case
is in line with the majority holdings, and is in point with the
present case, so the judgment must stand affirmed. Roberts v.
Drovers NationaZ Bank, 199 Ky. 439.
B. F.
CARRIERS-STREET RAILwAYs-DEGREE OF CARE FOl PASSENGERS RimnrG OUTSIDE RAImnG.--Appellee climbed on board a
crowded street car and stood on the outer rim behind the railing
which surrounds the rear vestibule.. The platform was crowded
and the transfer was handed to the conductor over the shoulders
of intervening passengers. The car made the usual stop at the
eastern intersection of X and Y streets, but no one got off. On
signal the car stopped again just beyond the western intersection of X and Y streets and a passenger alighted. An automobile, running from five to fifteen miles an hour, collided with the
car at the western intersection, striking appellee and seriously injuring him. The conductor 'did not see the automobile driver
or know of his approach until after the accident. Judgment was
rendered against both the driver of the automobile and the street
railway company. From a refusal of a peremptory instruction
to find for the latter, the street railway company appealed.
Upon the question whether a person who takes a dangerous
position on a crowded street car assumes the risk of that position
or is negligent per se in taking that position, or whether the carrier is negligent per se in permitting him to take that position,
the Kentucky court adheres neither to the extreme ground represented by Illinois on the one hand nor Massachusetts on the
other. In the former jurisdiction, to permit passengers to stand
on platforms or steps and cars to be overloaded is held to consti-
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tute negligence, Stucidy v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 182 Ill. App.
337, in the courts of the latter, it is not negligence for a street
car company to permit passengers to enter cars already crowded
and a passenger who voluntarily enters a crowded car assums
the risk incident to such crowded condition of the car, McCumber
v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 93 N. E. 698. As the mean between
these two extremes is the great weight of authority to the effect
that it is a question for the jury to determine whether or not a
passenger injured while riding in a dangerous position is guilty
of such contributory negligence as will excuse the carrier. The
Kentucky holding as to the care required for passengers riding
in places not designed for them, deducible from the majority
view, is that a carrier must exercise the highest degree of care
toward a passenger known to be riding in a dangerous position,
S. C. & C. C. Ry. Co. v. Hardy, 152 Ky. 374;,S. C. & C. S. Ry.
Co. v. Trowbridge, 163 Ky. 84.
On the question of whether the carrier exercised the highest
degree of care toward this appellee, the court reasoned that a
street railway company is not liable for injuries inflicted upon
passengers by the negligent acts of the driver of an automobile
which collided with a street car unless it in some way concurred in the negligence, since it is not an insurer of the safety
of its passengers, L. & N. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 163 Ky. 538, and as
negligence is never to be presumed from another a street car conductor may assume, in the absence of a contrary indication, that
an automobile following a street car will be driven with such
care that it can stop before colliding with the street car, even
if the street car stops at an unexpected place, since the automobile driver is charged with knowledge that street cars frequently
do stop at other than regular stopping places. Since the carrier
owes no duty to the passenger to protect him from this danger,
and since there can be no negligence without there is a breach of
duty, the stopping of the street car was not the proximate cause
of appellee's injuries. The court, therefore, should have given
a peremptory instruction to find for the street railway company.
Louisville & Nashville Railway v. Rice, 199 Ky. 196, 250 S. W.
863, decided May 15, 1923.
L. C.
CARR

GERs-I

RS-STREET RAIWAYS--DuTY TO AIGHTIG PASsm.

uRms To PASsEwmS.-The appellee owned and oper-
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ated a street railway in the city of Ashland. It had a regular
stbpping place on Winchester avenue, known as Rice Station.
At this station, there was no depot or other accommodations for
the convenience of alighting passengers except a few cinders
which covered the space of about three feet between the curbing
of the street and the track of the company. The appellant was
a regular passenger on the appellee's cars, and was destined for
Rice Station. As he stepped from the car to the ground, he
placed his foot on a stake and fell whereby he received the injuries complained of. The stake projected above the ground
some four or five inches and had been placed there at least three
years prior to the occurrence of the injury by a road construetion company. The appellant had seen the stake some time before the accident and had in a general way some idea of the
location of the stake but no actual knowledge that it was located
at or close to the stopping place. At the time the injury occurred
it was dark and the appellant could not see the stake. From
a verdict directed for defendant plaintiff appealed.
The duty of street railways to provide a safe place for passengers to alight is set forth in Nellis on Street Railways, second
edition, volume 1, section 308, to be: "In case of passengers injured in alighting from a street car owing to the condition of the
street, it is said that liability exists where the dangerous condition of the street is known or could have been known to the street
railway company, but is unknown to the alighting passenger,
unless he is warned or assisted to a safe place." Substantially
the same rule is set out in 10 Corpus Juris 926; 6 Cyclopedia of
Law and Procedure 606; Booth Street Railway Law, section 326;
and Michie on Carriers, volume II, page -.
In the Minnesota case of Stewart v. Railway Compavy, 80 N.
W. 854, the rule is stated to be: "A street railway company is not
responsible for the condition of the street on which it operates
its cars, but it is bound to exercise proper care to stop its cars
for discharge of passengers at a safe and suitable place for that
purpose." The court further holds that the street railway company must know of the existence of the danger or could have
known of its existence by the use of due care before it is liable
for any damages resulting therefrom. Each' of the following
cases was similar to the case above cited. The plaintiff was in-
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jured by defects in the street while alighting from the car of
the defendant street car company; the question before the court
was the duty of a street railway company to select a safe place
for alighting passengers; the judgment was for the plaintiff;
and substantially the same rule for determining the liability of
the company was stated: Sowash v. Traction Company, 188 Pa.
618; Railway Campany v. Scott, 86 Va. 902; MacDonald v. St.
Louis Transit Company, 198 Mo. A. 374, and Bass v. Concord
Rail.way Company, 70 N. H. 170.
The Kentucky cases are in accord with this general law.
The test for the liability of a street railway company is laid
down in Sweet v. LouisvWlle Railway Company, 113 Ky. 15, to be:
"If the street at the place of discharging the passenger presents
a dangerous condition to one alighting there, and such danger is
obvious to the passenger, the carrier is not liable to him for injuries received from such defects. But where the danger is
known, or is such as should have been known, to the carrier, and
is unknown, to the passenger, as where, because of darkness, he
cannot see it, the carrier is bound to warn the passenger of the
danger, or to assist him in alighting, or stop the car at a point
beyond or short of the dangerous point. Its failure to take one
of these precautions renders it liable to the passenger sustaining injury because of such neglect."
In the present case the court held that the defendant company, according to the facts, might have had actual knowledge
of the existence of the stake or by the exercise of ordinary care
could have had such knowledge; that the pliantiff was not prima
facie guilty of negligence in not seeing and avoiding the stake;
that, therefore, there was abundant evidence of the defendant's
neglect of its duty and the plaintiff's contributory negligence
to go to the jury; and, therefore, the case should be reversed and
remanded. Mayhlew v. Oaio Valley Electric Railway Company,
200 Ky. 104.
J.L.W.
CONTRACT

-

MUTUALITY

OF

OBLIGATIOx. -

Plaintiff pur-

chased a gas heating and lighting system from defendant company. The contract provided that the company would not
charge the plaintiff more than fifteen cents a pound for blau gas,
the fuel necessary to run the plant. The plaintiff did not obligate himself to purchase any gas from the defendant. Defend-
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ant refused to supply the gas to plaintiff at the agreed price.
This made the operation of the plant so expensive that plaintiff
was forced to install another heating and lighting system. Defendant was sued for the resulting damages. Court held that
plaintiff could not recover, neither party being bound.
Contracts, to be valid, must be mutually binding upon both
parties, Steinwender Stoffregen Coffee Company v. F. T. Guenther Company, 25 Ky. Law Reports 270. There are many cases
in which the offer is definite enough, yet the acceptor, by merely
accepting, has really himself promised nothing in return, has
not obligated, or made himself liable for anything, so that, although one is bound, the other is not, and the agreement lacks
mutuality. In such a case there is not an enforceable agreement,
Cyc. Law and Pro., volume 9, page 327. This is the general rule,
as well as the rule in Kentucky. Looking at the case from the
plaintiff's standpoint, the contract for the sale of gas was not
enflorceable, assuming that the defendant had been -bound.
The plaintiff had merely accepted, without in any way obligating
himself, and the contract lacked mutuality of obligation.
The fact that the court found, upon construction of the
contract, that the defendant had not obligated himself to sell
blau-gas to plaintiff, but in event he did sell not to charge over
a given price, shows that neither party was bound. This makes
the case doubly strong; for upon showing that either party was
not bound, the contract could not be enforced. 0. A. Olin Company v. Lambach, 35 Idaho 767; Steinwender Stoffregem Coffee
Company v. 7. T. G-tenther Company, 26 Ky. Law Reports 270.
But this seems an out-of-the-way method of procedure. The
duties imposed by law on the parties to a contract to perform
their agreements, constitutes the obligation to a contract. Obligation is the remedy that law provides for the enforcement of
contracts, State v. Carew, 91 Am. Dec. 245; Sharlock v. Rivers,
91 Am. Dec. 245. The existence of obligation is essential to a
valid contract, New York & Baltimore Transportation Line v.
U. S. Lighterage Company. Anson on Contracts, ch. I, p. 8.
This contract placed no obligation upon either party, and no
valid, or enforceable contract was formed. White v. Southern
Blau-Gas Company, 199 Ky. 118.
H. R. J.
DEScFNT AND DIsTRiBUTiON- iLs--m-RE AiNDER A TER

CASE COMMENTS
TRUST FOR LIFE TO SON'S "HEmS AT TIAW," MEANS DISTRIBUTEES.

INCLUDING SURVIVING WFE.-Action was instituted by plaintiff
as guardian and trustee against defendant and her infant daughter, seeking a construction of the thirteenth paragraph of the
will, which provided for the disposition of a large amount of
personalty. The testator made several specific devises in the
will. The portion pertinent to this case was the bequest of
shares for his son to be held in trust by the executor during the
beneficiary's life, and at the latter's death his share was to p-ass
to his heirs at law. After the death of the testator his son died
and was survived by a widow and infant daughter. The testator had expressly provided that no husband of any daughter
should acquire any marital rights or be deemed an heir at law,
but made no provisions as to the wives of the sons. The surviving
wife contends that she was and is entitled to one-half of the estate as widow, under the provision of the will reading, "at death
their several shares shall pass to 'their heirs at law.'
The court held that, although the word "heir," in its technical sense, does not include the surviving widow, the testator
intended, by the true construction of the will, that the shares
should pass upon the death of his son to his distributees, including the wife, if such he had.
The doctrine that a widow is not an heir at law of her husband and that a husband is not an heir of his wife, is sustained
by the great weight of authority. In the case of Higginbottom
v. Higginboltom, 177 Ky. 271, the court said: "So it has become
universal, that when the common law speaks of 'heirs' or 'heirs
at law' it uses these terms in their technical sense; the widow is
not in contemplation." This view is undoubtedly right, for an
heir is one who is born in lawful wedlock and upon whom the
law casts an estate in property immediately upon the death of
his ancestor.
However, a widow is an heir of her deceased husband in a
limited sense and not in the general sense. Masonic Insurance
Co. v. Miller, 13 Bush (Ky.) 489; McNutt v. McNutt, 116 Ind.
545; Unfried v. Herberrer,63 Ind. 67.
In the principal case the testator had expressly provided
that no husband of any of his daughters should acquire a marital right in the estate given or be deemed heir at law. No such
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provision was made with respect to the wives of his sons. The
court in deciding this point invoked an ancient rule of construction, which seems proper, "That where certain designated things
are specifically denied, the corresponding or correlative thing
will conversely be given." The court further points out "that
the testator by saying in his will that no husband of his daughters should be an heir at law, he granted the converse, that it is
persuasive that the testator intended by the expression 'shall
pass to their heirs at law,' the property held in trust for his son
should pass upon his death to his distributees, including his wife.
Therefore, under section 2132 of the Kentucky Statutes, the wife
was entitled to one-half the surplus personalty left by the decedent." Fidelity & Col;umbia Trust Co. v. Vogt, "et al., 199 Ky.
12.
A.H.
EVEDENCE-ORAL EVIDENCE CONTRACT WAs DELIVERED ON
CONDITION PRECEDENT DOES NOT VARY ITS TERm.-Appellees

owned a patent right covering an invention for an alleged new
milk strainer. By a writing appellees granted to the appellants
the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the articles covered
by the letters patent, for a period of five years, in consideration
of certain royalties. Plaintiffs allege a violation of 'the contract
and brought suit, the trial resulting in a verdict and judgment
for the appellees. Appellants set up that, they being unfamiliar
with the patent law, by agreement sent the sample strainer and

letters patent to a firm of lawyers for them to investigate and for
information as to the yalidity of the patent. At the request of
the appellees, the paper filed in suit was signed at this time, but
with the distinct understanding and agreement that it was not
to become effective until and unless the attorneys reported favorably and in the event of an adverse report, the signed papers
to be returned and destroyed. The attorneys did report unfavorably and all agreed that the matter was at an end. The trial
court excluded evidence as to the conditional delivery of the
instrument and on that point the appellants appeal.
The court held that the condition precedent, upon which
the existence of the contract depended, should have been admitted.
While the courts hold that parol evidence is inadmissible to
show a condition subsequent to a written contract (it superim-
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poses additional conditions therein and would vary the terms)
yet, the courts uniformly hold that parol evidence is admissible
to show that a written contract was delivered on a condition
precedent, that it should not take effect until the happening of a
certain contingency. This is no variance of the terms of the contract and such evidence merely shows there was no contract until
the condition had been complied with.
In Ware v. Allen, 128 U. S. 591, which was an action upon a
written instrument, the defense was that it was understood between the parties at the time the instrument was signed that it
should not be of any effect unless certain named contingencies
occurred, which never did occur. Justice Miller said: "The contract sued upon never went into effect, the condition upon which
it was to become operative never occurred and it was not a question of contradicting or varying the terms of the contract."
In the case of Pyme v. Allen, 6 El. and BI. 370, the court
pointed out, "The distinction in point of law is that evidence to
vary terms of a written instrument is not admissible, bat evidence to show there is no agreement at all is admissible."
Burke v. Dulane, 153 U. S. 228, sets out the same doctrine. See
also Cleveland Refining Co. v. Dunning, 115 Mich. 238; Wilson
v.P owers, 131 Mass. 539; Benton v. Martin, 52 N. Y. 510. The
decision of this case is also in entire accord with Case Co. v.
Barnes, 133 Ky. 330, the court saying: "The execution of the
writings and their delivery under the agreement did not constitute them a contract because they were not to become operative
until certain conditions were performed."
The general conclusion, as can be seen by a review of the
decisions of the courts of the various states, is that the holding of
the Kentucky court in this case was consistent with the holdings
of other states. Pickerell v. Wilson, 199 Ky. 20.
A. H.
FALSE IMPmSoNMENT.-Plaintiff was cashier in one of defendant's stores. She complained that she was compelled by
Burns, the company's superintendent, to go to Cincinnati from
Covington, to the office of the company, and was there "sweated"
and grilled to obtained evidence of thefts from the store by employees. That she was forced to go from there to the office of an
attorney where she was again grilled. She gave testimony that
bore out the allegations, but her only witness and all those of
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the defendant testified that she acted of her own free will on request, and was neither threatened, embarrassed or worried. She
sued for false imprisonment.
To constitute the injury of false imprisonment there are
two points necessary: "1. The detention of thd person. 2.
The unlawfulness of such detention. Every confinement of the
person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison,
or a private house, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets." III Blackstone, 127; N. Y. P. & N. R. Co. v. Waldron, 116 Md. 441; Finney v. Zingale, 82 W. Va. 422; Poor v.
Coombs, 15 Ky. L. R. 845. Neither malice nor want of probable
cause is necessary. Kroeger v. Passmore, 36 Mont. 504; Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Oh. St. 171.
It is not necessary that the person should be arrested or
assaulted, if he is detained by threats of violence and prevented
from going where he wishes it is sufficient. Johnson v. Tompkins, 1 Baldwin 571; Whitman v. A. T. & S. P., 85 Kan. 150;
Pike v. Hanson. 9 N. H. 491. The words or threats must be such
as would detain a reasonably prudent man. Smith v. The State,
7 Hump. (Tenn.) 43; Hebrew v. Pulis, 73 N. J. L. 621; Martin v.
Houck, 141 N. Ca. 317; Bernheimer v. Becker, 102 Md. 250.
The detention must have been against the will of the person
complaining, for he cannot charge another with his own voluntary acts. Cant v. Parsons (1834) 6 C. & P. 504; Arrowsmith
v. Lq Mesurier (1806) 2 Bos. & P. (N. R.) 211; Miller v. Ashcraft, 98 Ky. 314; Shinglemeier v. Wright, 124 Mich. 230; Payson v. Macomber, 3 Allen (Mass.) 69; Cottam v. Oregon City, 98
Fed. 570; Hershey v. O'Neil, 36 Fed. 168.
Since the evidence presented clearly showed that the plaintiff went to Cincinnati of her own free will, and acted of her own
free will while there, the judgment of the lower court for the
plaintiff was reversed on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. Poor v. Coombs and Miller v. Asheraft,
supra; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Hamlin, 193 Ky. 116.
In connection with this case the case of The Tot chester
Beach Improvement Co. v. Steinmeier (72 Md. 313, 8 L. R. A.
846) is interesting. It was there held that a corporation cannot
be held liable for an arrest ordered by a superintendent of a company at a certain place, whose office is not mentioned or de-
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scribed in its charter, unless it is shown that he had express authority for giving the order, or that it was ratified and adopted
by the corporation. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. PlaggenJ.W.G.
burg, 199 Ky. 551.
INJuNCTiON-A:ANI)ATorY NJUNmC ON NOT IssUED iFRE EDY AT LAw IS ADEQUATF-PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION Op FIRE
LInIs HELD ADEQATE.-The defendant, in violation of a city
ordinance, built a wooden house within the fire zone. The ordinance provided a fine of twenty-five dollars for its violation, and
provided that each day of such violation should constitute a separate offense. The defendant appeals from a decree for a mandatory injunction. The question involved in this case is:
Whether an injunction will lie to prevent the violation of a city
ordinance, there being an adequate remedy at law imposed for
its violation. The general rule is that an injunction will not lie
to prevent the threatened violation of an ordinance, the remedy
being an action at law to recover the penalties imposed.
In the case of Williamsport v. McFadden, 15 Wkly. Notes,
Cas. 269: "A bill in equity was filed by a city to enjoin B. from
erecting a wooden building within the fire limit fixed by the ordinance of the city. B. demurred to the bill on the ground that
equity had no jurisdiction to aid the city in enforcing its ordinances, and that there was a sufficient remedy at law." Held,
"Injunction will not lie to enforce a municipal ordinance forbidding the erection of a wooden building within the fire limit,
since the statute authorizing the ordinance provides that the city
may fix penalties for its violation." The case of the Village of
Brockport v. Johvnston, 13 Abb. N. C. 468, it was held: "The
construction of wooden buildings in a village will not be enjoined
where the statute provides for the enforcement of ordinance by
the imposition of a penalty for its violation." In the case of
New Rochelle v. Lang, 27 N. Y. Supp. 600, it was held that: "An
injunction will not lie to restrain the building of a wooden house
within the fire limits of a village in violation of a village ordinance." Supporting these cases are: St. Johns v. McFarlan, 33
ich. 72; Young v. Schea, 9 N. Y. Supp. 349; Elwood City v.
Mani, 16 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 474; Village of Waupun v. Moore, 34
Wis. 450; Janesvi7le v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288. The cases and
opinions cited above appear to be the prevailing rule. The case of
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Kaufman v. Stein, 138 Ind. 49, is contrary. Held: "An injunction lies to prevent the removal of a wooden building to a
place within the fire limit in violation of a city ordinance."
The Kentucky courts hold that where there is an adequate
remedy at law equity will not interfere, but will leave the parties to their remedy at law. Dunwidie v. Kerley, 6 J. J. Marsh.
501. In the case of Bates v. City of Monticelo, 173 Ky. 244, it
was held that the ordinance did not provide a sufficient punishment, the penalty being a fine of $100.00 for the construction of
a wooden building within the fire limit. Since one prosecution
would be a bar to all future violations a mandatory injunction
was granted.
In the present case the ordinance makes it possible for the
defendant, in violation of the ordinance, to be fined $25.00 for
,each day's violation by him, thus providing an adequate remedy
at law by the continuous prosecutions. The judgment appealed
from should therefore be reversed, with directions to sustain
the demurrer to the petition. Robinson v. Town of Paintsville,
199 Ky. 247.
B.F.
MARwIAa--EvDmsxE.-Plaintiff sued for a divorce from a
marriage which defendant denied. Plaintiff alleged the marriage took place January, 1911, in Nashville, Tenn., and that
at intervals thereafter plaintiff and defendant lived together and
conducted themselves toward the world at large as husband and
wife. During this period defendant wrote plaintiff many letters,
submitted in evidence, acknowledging the marriage. Defendant
became cruel toward plaintiff and subsequently abandoned her.
Though in Kentucky, since the passage of the Revised Statutes, there is no such thing as a legal marriage by recognition
and cohabitation alone, and though all marriages to be valid
must be solemnized and contracted in the presence of authorized
persons or societies (Est.7l v. Rogers, 64 Ky. 62), the validity of
a marriage must be determined by the law of the place where
the marriage occurred (Potterv. Stanley, 187 Ky. 292). Where
the alleged marriage was consummated in another state, .he presumption is, in absence of proof to the contrary, that the common
law prevailed therein at the time (K/enkce v. Nooan, 118 Ky.
436). No ceremony was required at common law, it being sufficient if there was an agreement to accept the other as spouse and
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the agreement was carried into execution. Evidence of declarations of marriage are held sufficient to warrant the presumption
that there was a valid marriage in the absence of a contrary
showing, and the court will not stop to inquire whether such
marriage was ceremonial.
In holding that a common law marriage valid in the state
where consummated is binding in Kentucky and admitting evidence thereof, the court followed the weight of authority and
its own leading case, Kenke v. Noonan, 118 Ky. 436.
Scott v.
Scott, 200 Ky. 153, 252 S. W. 1019. Decided June 22, 1923. L. C.
MN-ES AM ADNEA.Ls-PowER OF

MNE SUPERINTENDENT TO

CONTRACT FOR SALE OF TIMBER STANDING ON THE PROPERTY OF

CORPORATION.-The appellee, a corporation, was the owner
of a coal mine located in Boyd county, Kentucky. The main
office of the appellee was at Winchester, some distance from the
mine. The superintendent of the mine entered into a contract
with appellant to cut and saw timber on the land of the appellee.
The president of the corporation later visited the mine and
learned for the first time of the contract made by the superintendent. The appellant had expended a large amount of money
in preparation for carrying out the contract and had cut and
sawed some of the timber for which the corporation, in fair play,
paid with the understanding that no more timber was to be cut.
The appellee now seeks to cancel the contract.
THE

The conclusion that there was no express authority from the
corporation to the mine superintendent to enter into the contract
is supported by the preponderance of evidence that no notice or
proceeds of the contract were ever reported or received by the
main office of the corporation.
The mining superintendent with authority to run a commissary, to employ miners, construct miners' cabins, and to
lease them, and to lease a small area of land for mining coal, all
of which powers may be classified as coming within his duties
as superintendent of mining corporations, does not give him any
implied or apparent authority to enter into a contract for the
manufacture and sale of lumber for commercial purposes from
timber growing upon the corporation's property. This conclusion is reached by the fact that the sale of this timber is in no
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way connected with the usual and necessary operation of a coal
mine.
The general rule in regard to powers of the superintendents
of coal mines is that their power is only to enter into such contracts as are usual and necessary to carry on the business according to the general custom of the coal mining business. Raven
Red Ash CoaZ Co. v. Herron,75 N. E. 752.
The usual operation of a coal mine does not call for the
sale of the timber standing on the property and as the authority
of the superintendent only applies to those acts which are necessary to the operation of the mine, it will be noted that the right
to contract for the sale of the timber is not implied nor apparent
from the fact of the contracting party being superintendent of
the mine on which the timber was located.
The mere fact that the president of the corporation, when he
ascertained that the appellant had been cutting timber for the
corporation from its property under an unauthorized contract
made by its mine superintendent paid the party for the sawing
already done, and agreed that he might saw the logs then on
hand, in belief it was only fair to the party to do so, but with an
understanding that no more timber was to be cut, does not show
a ratification of the contract, as there was no act on the part of
the corporation in reference to accepting the contract but only
acted so as to be fair to the party who had acted and expended
money on belief of the validity of the contract.
The failure of the corporation to ascertain that its mining
superintendent had without authority made a contract with
appellant for the cutting of timber on the corporation's property
until after appellant had expended a large sum of money in preparing to perform the contract, does not estop the corporation
from thereafter refuting the contract, since it is a general principle that one who deals with an agent must inform himself of
the agent's right to act, and the appellant therefore assumed the
risk of the agent's act being authorized.
In the absence of facts or circumstances sufficient to put a
reasonably prudent man on inquiry, no duty rests upon the
principal to make any effort to discover whether another is
doing unauthorized acts in his name, and he has a right to assume, until otherwise advised, that his agent will act in the
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scope of his authority. Notice is not to be imputed to a principal by reason of the mere fact that he had reasonable opportunity to acquire knowledge of the acts of the agent. Brown v.
Bamberg, 110 Ala. 342; Combs v. Scott, (Mass.), 12 Allen 493;
Jackson v. Ogren, 102 Minn. 8; Phoenix Valley Bank v. Brown,
9 Ariz. 311.
The mere fact that the corporation reimbursed the appellant
for his work on the contract does not act as a ratification of the
contract by the corporation. There can be no recovery on the
theory of ratification. There is no estoppel against the corporation for failure to discover the contract. There is then no ground
for a conclusion that the contract is binding on the corporation.
H. W. F.
Cole v. Big Run Coal Co., 199 Ky. 49.
MUNicipAiL

CORPORATIONS-DELEGATION

op DISCRETIONARY

PowEis.-City council, under power given by statutes to hire an
engineer for a particular work, attempted to delegate that power
to the mayor. The mayor hired an engineer under contract that
he is to receive five per centum of the cost of construction work
as his compensation for the work. This contract made by the
mayor was never ratified by the council. The question before the
court was: Whether the city can carry into effect such a contract
by way of levying the five per centum engineering cost on property owners.
Kentucky Statutes, section 3558, gives a city council power
to employ an engineer for a particular work. But this power
is expected to remain in the council without delegation so that
the council may be deemed the ultimate governing body of the
city. This power is confided to the discretion of the city council
and should be exclusive in them. Jameison v. City of Paduca.,
195 Ky. 71, 241 S. W. 327. Another Kentucky case which lays
down the same principle of a governing body being unable to
delegate a discretionary power given it by statute is Floyd
County v. Bridge Co., 143 Ky. 696. In the Floyd county case,
the flscal court attempted to delegate power to contract for
bridges to a committee of three good businless men. The court
held the contract could not be enforced because such a delegation
of discretionary power was not valid.
The principal case and the Kentucky eases generally seem
to be directly in line with the law as recognized in most juris-
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dictions. The powers vested in a city council in the nature of
discretionary or governmental cannot be delegated to administrative officers. 19 R. C. L. 798; People v. Clean St. Co., 225 Ill.
470; 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 455; City of Harlanv. Coombs Land Co.,
199 Ky. 87. Decided May 4, 1923.
E. E. S.
PAYmNT--CEcKS-RECFIPT.-Plaintiff claims that he
hauled dirt under an optional contract which would allow him
to receive payment at a certain rate per day for each man and
team used, or at so much per yard of dirt removed. Defendant
denies the option. Plaintiff received checks from time to time
bearing on their faces the words, "In full payment of the amount
due," and so endorsed as to be receipts. Plaintiff admits that the
payments received would fully satisfy the first clause of the option, but he says that he elected to receive payment under the
second clause. Defendant claims that the checks are conclusive
evidence that the contract called for payment at so much per
day for each man and team employed. The question was whether
plaintiff could present evidence in contradiction of the recital of
full payment.
The general rule appears to be that a receipt in full may be
rebutted, but such a receipt is conclusive in the absence of fraud,
duress, misrepresentation, or dispute as to the debt for which
it was given. The following cases hold that a receipt in full
may be rebutted: McLeod v. Citizens Bank (1911), 61 Fla. 343,
350; Atlantic Coast Line v. Blalack (1910), 8 Ga. App. 44; People v. Davis (1915), 269 Ill, 256; Fordv. St. L. K. & N. W. By.
(1880), 54 Ia. 723; Kepler v. Jessup, 11 Ind. App. 241; Gilman
v. Inhabitants (1895), 70 Me. 183; Nelson v. Weeks (1872), 111
Mass 223; Churchill v. Bradley (1878), 43 N. Y. Super. 170;
Keim, v. Kawfman (1894), 15 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 539 z Feamster v.
Withrow (1878), 12 W. Va. 611; Catlin v. Wheeler (1880), 49
Wis. 507; Worth v. Mumford, (N. Y. 1855), 1 Hilt. 1; The Galloway C. Morris, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 164, where a seaman claiming a
certain sum for wages due him was refused payment of a portion of it, unless he would sign a receipt in full against the owner
of the schooner; FireIns. Co. v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 584; Decker
v. Laws (1905), 74 Ark. 286; Ramsdale v. Clark (1897), 20 Mont.
203.
A receipt in full is conclusive in the absense of fraud, duress
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or misrepresentation. Under the Code, Cowan v. Sapp (1883),
74 Ala. 44, and Eufaula Nat'l Bank v. Passmore (1893), 102
Ala. 370; Aborm v. Rathbone (1886), 54 Conn. 444; Conyers v.
Graham (1888), 81 Ga. 675; Verdin v. Stoekbridge (1891), 74
Md. 481; Battle v. McArthur (191 C. C.), 49 Fed. 715; DeArmaud v. U. S. (1894), 151 U. S. 483, held that a receipt in full on
receiving payment of a claim, as reduced by the Secretary of
War, is a bar to any further demand, when there is no allegation
that it was given in ignorance of its purport, or under circumstances amounting to duress.
Missouri appears to hold that a check similar to the one
under discussion becomes a contract as soon as the payee endorses
it, and after that it cannot be contradicted by parol evidence.
(Gregg v. Roaring Land & Mining Co., 97 Mo. App. 44, decided
in 1902). This rule is in contradiction to the rule in Fire Insurancwe Co. v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 584.
Since 1813 Kentucky has held, in accordance with the general rule, that a receipt may be contradicted (Johnson v. Carneal's Admr., 16 Ky. 172, where a bond was held to be such a
contradiction of a receipt that the person presenting the receipt
must prove that it was given on receiving satisfaction for the
bond); Newton's Extr. v. Field, 98 Ky. 193; Mannakee v. McClosky, 23 K. L. R. 515; M/. Cent. R. R. v. Manion, 113 Ky. 7;
MusselZman v. Cin., N.. 0. & T. P. By., 126 Ky. 505; King's
Admr. v. Dorsey, 145 Ky. 176; Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Berryman
Realty Co, 193 Ky. 7.
The decisions in Kentucky do not appear to lay down any
fixed rule as to the grounds which must be alleged for contradicting a receipt. Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Berryman Realty Co.,
193 Ky. 7, allowed a receipt to be contradicted which acknowledged full payment though only part of the claim had been paid,
on the ground that payment of part of a claim about to become
due was not sufficient consideration for cancelling the whole
claim. DeArnaud v. U. S., supra, appears to limit the right of
contradiction to cases of fraud, duress or misrepresentation.
In the case under discussion a new trial was granted under
the rule that the recitals on checks given by defendant to plaintiff that they were given and received in full payment of the
amounts due, while prima facie evidence that the full amount
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has been paid, are not conclusive upon the plaintiff, but he may
in avoidance thereof show the truth.
As far as this rule goes it appears to be in accord with the
general rule as illustrated by the cases which have been cited.
When applied to this case it would appear to permit plaintiff to
prove that the option was not to be exercised until the work had
been completed, and that the sums acknowledged were merely
given to care for the expense of operations. A contention of
duress, or fraud, would be hard to sustain, where the payments
are distributed over a considerable period of time as these were.
Garriottv. Brandenburg Construction Co., 199 Ky. 676.
J. W. G.
TRIAI-MOTION TO TRANSFE TO EQUITY CAN BE MADE E' RN
AFTR JuRy TRIL OF THE CAsE.-Appellee tenant sues the appel-

lant landlord for various contracts arising out of their relationship of landlord and tenant. The provisions of the contract, as
well as the present state of affairs between them, are very complicated. Appellant makes motion to transfer to equity after
one jury trial of the case.
Section 10 of the Kentucky Civil Code says that an ordinary
action may be transferred to the equity docket if the defendant
ask by motion made that it be done when or before he answers.
Subsection 4 of the same section says that a court may order, at
its discretion, such a transfer whenever the court shall be of the
opinion that the facts involved are so complicated as to make
trial by jury impracticable. This case involves a construction
of these provisions of the Code.
This court has uniformly held that a court of equity has
concurrent jurisdiction in matters of account and should be exercised when otherwise there may be serious doubts as to the true
state of the accounts, or difficulty in satisfactorily adjusting
them, and safely striking a balance. Breckinridge v. Brooks,
2 A. K. Marsh. 335; Power v. Reeder, 9 Dana 6. It seems by
these decisions and many others in this state and elsewhere that
there is no question of doubt but that a case involving complicated accounts is a fit subject for equity jurisdiction.
But we are concerned here with the question of when a
transfer to equity may be availed of.. Appellant did not make
a motion to transfer the case to equity when it fied its answer,
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as is required by section 2, supra; on the contrary it filed a motion to transfer after a jury trial had been held. But it seems
by giving a broad construction to subsection 4 of section 10 of
the Kentucky Civil Code, as is befitting equity, it may be said that
a transfer to equity may be good at any time whatsoever when
the court shall be of opinion that the complication of accounts
justifies a transfer. Subsection 4, supra, is drawn to cover cases
of this very character. PhiladelphiaV. & L. Co. v. Garrisona,160
Ky. 329; Coy v. King, 199 Ky. 65, decided May 4, 1923. E. S.

